The term governance and good governance form almost part of our daily vocabulary. Governance describes the processes, mechanisms and institutions through which collective decision are made and implemented; citizens, groups and communities pursue their visions, articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (Corlinius Adablah, 2004). The quality of governance is thus determined by the impact of the exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens (Huther and Shah, 1999). Governance, as a dynamic process, has several emphases, and has been defined in literature to encompass local governance, decentralised governance, or democratic governance.
The wisdom of effective participation in the governing of the people by the governor through elective legitimacy was not challenged by society, except by its dictatorial members such as traditional rulers who source their positions from lineage, military rulers who take power by force of arms, or constitutional dictators who are able to manipulate the rule of law (legal and judicial) to entrench themselves in power for too long. To keep the detached rural and local societies under control, the PNDC administration saw to the fashioning out of a local government system that had the District Chief Executive (DCE) unelected, and one-third of the assembly members appointed by government, though the 1992 Constitution provides in Article 240 clause 2, sections (d) and (e). This was as a measure to ensure accountability of “local government authorities”.
Article 243 clauses 1, 2 (c) and 3 (b) did not only render the Constitution internally inconsistent, but also made sure that central government, and by extension the ruling party, and its local agents had manipulative authority and power over the district chief executive, and he or she so recognised that. The local government system in Ghana currently faces setbacks, scores of local government experts and political watchers have shared light on the causes of the seemingly non performance of the decentralized local government bodies. Many have sought to question the mode of selection of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executive (MMDCE).
On this note, an argument on whether MMDCEs should be appointed by the central government (maintain the status quo) or should be elected by the people at the grassroots (changing the status quo) is presented. Several reasons have been advanced in favour of making the position elective or non elective. This brings us to the bottom line by resolving the issue “MMDCEs should be elected by the people at the grassroots”.
General recommendations have been proposed which could help solve or neutralize all associated outcomes on the subject. The decentralization policy is to ensure a bottom up and participatory development planning approach that can help ensure the active involvement of all stakeholders. In our estimation, if the appointment of MMDCEs to the District Assemblies continues then it would take Ghana several decades to lift the over six million poor Ghanaians out of poverty. It will also continually undermine the country's fledgling democracy. It is therefore appealed to parliament to consider reviewing the relevant sections of the constitution to ensure that the people at the grassroots elect their MMDCEs.
1.2 Decentralisation Reforms:
Decentralization is an “omnibus” word widely used by practising politicians, administrators and academics with many different meanings. However, Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984) provide one widely accepted definition of decentralization as the transfer of the responsibility for planning, decision making or administrative authority from central government to its field organisations.
In the post-independence period from 1957 onwards, local government was generally weak and subject to the centralization of power that was typical of the post-colonial state. Attempts at decentralizing functions were introduced at different times; for instance in 1974 there was a decentralization reform which was generally characterized by deconcentration, and aimed at strengthening central government control at the local level (Nkrumah 2000).
A historical aspect was the decentralization reforms introduced in between (1981-92). In 1983, there was a policy of administrative decentralization of central government ministries, alongside the creation of People’s Defense Committees (PDCs) in each town and village. The PDCs, made up of local activists as self-identified defenders of the ‘revolution’, effectively took over local government responsibilities, though often limited to mobilizing the implementation of local self-help projects (Nkrumah 2000), while the deconcentrated ministries played a more significant role.
Ayee (2000) noted that around this same period (1981-92), the interest in decentralization reflected that of previous regimes, that is, an interest in the administrative decentralization of central government and not the devolution of political authority to the local level. Additionally, he perceives a key feature of local governance in the pre-1988 period as a dual hierarchical structure in which central and local government institutions “operated in parallel”.
1.3 The Status Quo:
The Local Government Act 462 provides that there shall be a District Chief Executive for each district who shall be appointed by the President with the prior approval of not less than two-thirds majority of the members of the District Assembly present and voting at the meeting. The term of office of a District Chief Executive shall be four years. A person shall not hold office as a District Chief Executive for more than two terms in succession. The emoluments of a District Chief Executive shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund and shall be determined by a committee under article 71 of the Constitution.
The District Chief Executive shall be the chairman of the Executive Committee of the District Assembly. The District Chief Executive shall:
- Preside at meetings of the Executive Committee of the District Assembly and in his absence a member present from among themselves shall reside;
- Be responsible for the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of the Assembly;
- Be responsible for the supervision of the departments of the Assembly; and
- Be the chief representative of the Central Government in the district.
- A vote of no confidence, supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of the District Assembly, is passed against him; or
- He is removed from office by the President; or
- He resigns or dies.
Several reasons have been advanced in favour of making the position elective. The importance of electing MMDCEs by the people at the grassroots includes:
Firstly, it enhances universal acceptability. Under the current dispensation, the president appoints the head of the MMDAs based on partisan politics ground. This tends to breed apathy amongst those at the side of divide. Those who belong to the ruling party see the appointed member as one of their own blood and that the appointed person should adhere to their demands the swiftest. Electing MMDCEs will help solve this bias.
Secondly, when the heads of MMDAs are elected it will help ensure continuity in developmental activities. This is because the elected will be there not to pursue any agenda of a political party which are often selective in terms of scope and area of operation. Under the current non elective mode, MMDCEs may pursue vigorously developmental activities in areas that are loyal or sympathetic to the cause of the governing party of which the District Chief Executive is a member of. This practice sometimes leads to having projects being abandoned.
Thirdly, it helps in curtailing the emergence of “foot soldiers unrest”. What is featuring more prominently in the local government front is the “foot soldiers unrest” which has resulted in handful of political heads of MMDAs losing their job. If the position was elective under no circumstance will some aggrieved members of the ruling party get the nerve to demand the resignation of the elected MMDCEs.
Again, it improves performance. Electing the MMDCEs means they will go to the people regularly to seek or renew their mandate to serve. When that happens (as is the case at the national level) MMDCEs who underperform will be kicked out and new ones brought in to deliver the goods. Agyei-Badu (2006) fully agrees that the MMDCEs should be elected so they can be more accountable to the people, thus the electorates will judge them by their performance. He posited that if they are elected we will depart from the hypocrisy that the MMDCE's position is non-partisan.
1.5 Arguments against the Election of MMDCEs:
A decentralisation expert, Mr Kwamena Ahwoi, has stated that although about 80 per cent of stakeholders in the district assembly concept favour the election of District Chief Executives (DCEs) by the people at the grassroot, he is of a strong conviction that any move towards that would bring anarchy, inefficiency and marginalisation of women. Under this sub section, the reasons why MMDCEs should be appointed and not elected by the people at the grassroot are presented. These reasons are expatiated below:
Firstly, it enhances harmony between the president and the appointee. Some local government analysts posit that once the president has been elected through popular votes, then it means that the entire citizenry at that particular time have bought into his development agenda. These analysts again suggest that the president must be allowed to appoint his able lieutenants in order to execute his developmental agenda. The brain behind this is to ensure harmony, avert the retardation in development and sabotage that may possibly emanate when the elected heads of districts do not see eye with a president due to discrepancies in development agenda.
Secondly, it checks corruption. Even though the current mode of selecting MMDA political heads provide grounds for them to be corrupt, the level of corruption predictably will be worse under an elective mode of selection. All things being equal aspirants who may seek election may invest heavily in campaign after securing the position may think of recouping every pesewa invested thereby breeding corruption.
In addition, it checks ethnic differences. Quite a number of districts in the country are made up of majority and minority ethnic groups and with such local elections, there is the likelihood that those from the majority ethnic groups would always be elected and this would make the minority ethnic group feel marginalised. When this happens, they would begin to agitate to have a district of their own and this will introduce anarchy into the local governance system because the authorities would not be able to meet such demands, especially when such areas did not satisfy the criteria for becoming a district assembly.
1.6 The Bottom Line:
From the previous sections, it can be seen that the affirmative outweighs the negative. Resolved: MMDCEs should be elected by the people at the grassroots. There is the need for a review of the 1992 constitutional on the nomination of MMDCEs by the President. This calls for few modifications to make the system less political and more of a local based initiative.
Mr Kwesi Jonah (2011), a lecturer at the Political Science Department of the University of Ghana, once said “For people to enter into politics they must be elected and not nominated in order to stop corruption, patronage and other corrupt practices in local governance”. In most cases, our presidents offer the positions of DCEs to people as payback for some service rendered. The offer of DCE jobs as gifts and rewards to political cronies also explains why the district assemblies are so ineffective and inefficient. The only way to change this is to allow the people to choose their MMDCEs. It may not be the most politically expedient thing to do. But it’s what this country needs to make sure that decentralisation concept works for the people.
The MMDAs as presently constituted continue to be hostage to central government through the power of appointment by the President. This is because deepening democracy requires far reaching reforms at the district and municipal level to make them truly an expression of the political will of the people at the grassroots.
If the motive for appointing MMDCEs and some assembly members by the President is to ensure that policies at the district level were consistent with the national ones then it was possible to appoint technical advisers to the assemblies to help in the formulation, implementation and review of policies at the district level. If the current trend continues then it would take Ghana several decades to lift the remaining six million poor Ghanaians out of poverty.
The idea that the elective mode is expensive is not reflective. What is more costly than living development projects abandoned? In Techiman municipality, about 10 percent of development projects were abandoned in 2008 as a result of a change of government. Under the current non elective mode, MMDCEs may pursue vigorously developmental activities in areas that are loyal or sympathetic to the cause of the governing party, making other places vulnerable. The sad story is that sometimes when there is a change of government, these developmental activities become abandoned. When the political heads of MMDAs are elected, continuity in developmental activities will be ensured. This is because they will not pursue any agenda of a political party.
1.7 Recommendation:
In our estimation, it is recommended that the president, in consultation with party executives and other stakeholders of the district should nominate as many as possible eligible persons for the position of the MMDCEs and then the people at the grassroots would cast their votes to elect one nominee for the chief executive position. These nominees should be allowed to campaign within a specified period of time to sell their mission, vision and program outlines to the electorates. The electorates at the grass root will then assess their performance based on their competence and manifesto presentation to elect their MMDCEs.
This also means that various metropolitan, municipal and district coordinating directors must be empowered to hold forth in the interim (as it is inherently but with additional powers) until substantive MMDCEs are elected. This will help to ensure political commitment and loyalty since nominations for such elections will have to be made by president and decentralized office made conterminous with that of the presidency. However, power of impeachment must be left to the people in their respective districts in accordance with the laid down procedures in order to ensure continuity and accountability.
There should be a vetting committee to vet applicants and the vetting process should be made public and possible broadcast on local FM stations to enable electorates to make informed decisions and choices. The determination of the constitution of the vetting committee should be worked out by the Ministry of Local Government which should include experts from within the respective districts. There should also be mechanism in place to check abuse of office and possible removable from office just like in case of the President.
Furthermore, MMDCEs should be elected alongside with District Assembly members and NOT alongside President or MPs. This means the DCEs term of office would overlap that of the President and MPs at any given time. This is likely to minimize the politics of the process.
Again, MMDCEs’ term of office should be same as that of the President at any given time. But unlike the President who can only run for two terms, DCEs should run as many times as possible provided they have the mandate of their people. This would ensure and enhance performance and reduce corruption since MMDCEs know that so long as they perform effectively and efficiently the people’s power would be given to them to govern.
1.8 Conclusion:
The decentralization policy is to ensure a bottom up and participatory development planning approach that can help ensure the active involvement of all stakeholders. In our estimation, if the appointment of MMDCEs to the Assemblies continues then it would take Ghana several decades to lift the remaining six million poor Ghanaians out of poverty. It will also continually undermine the country's fledgling democracy. It is therefore appealed to parliament to consider reviewing the relevant sections of the constitution to ensure that the people at the grassroots elect their MMDCEs.
LIST OF REFERENCES:
- Ayee, R.A. (1993). Decentralisation and Local Government under the PNDC. Gyimah-Boadi (Ed), Ghana under PNDC rule, CODESRIA, Dakar.
- Government of Ghana, (1993) Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) (4th Edition) Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development Publication, Accra.
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